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Abstract
Spencer, Lauren A., M.S. The University of Memphis. August 2014. The effect of
evaluator reputation on feedback acceptance. Major Professor: Jeffrey S. Berman, Ph.D.
This experiment examined whether acceptance of feedback is affected by evaluator
reputation, defined as the feedback recipient’s perception of the source as a generally easy
versus hard evaluator. It was hypothesized that when feedback valence was inconsistent
with the evaluator’s reputation concerning feedback, feedback would have a greater effect
on the recipient’s self-perceptions, and secondarily, that feedback acceptance would
depend on self-esteem level. Participants received false feedback on their levels of social
awareness after completing a task and being told that the experimenter was either a hard
or easy evaluator. Participants then provided post-feedback ratings of self-perceived
social awareness. Results did not support the hypotheses, but instead suggested that
feedback from an easy evaluator had a greater effect on participant self-perceptions than
feedback from a hard evaluator. These findings add to our understanding of self-concept
change, and may have implications in the fields of organizational psychology, academics,
and sports psychology.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
People use evaluative information that they receive from others to form their own
self-perceptions and self-evaluations (Baumeister, 1998). This information is often
obtained when one individual evaluates another individual in a certain domain based on
performance or some other type of behavior. Evaluation by a college instructor or work
supervisor are common examples. In some cases, the recipient of feedback will adjust
self-perceptions in accordance with feedback (Binderman, Fretz, Scott, & Abrams, 1972;
Harvey & Clapp, 1965), which is referred to as feedback acceptance, and many factors
have been found to determine the degree to which feedback acceptance occurs. For
example, past research has shown that people are more likely to accept feedback that is
positive (Halperin, Snyder, Shenkel, & Houston, 1976; Lundgren, Sampson, and Cahoon,
1998; Snyder & Cowles, 1979), consistent with initial self-perceptions (Shrauger, 1975),
from a source perceived as credible (Binderman et al., 1972; Halperin et al., 1976;
Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1999; Wilson & Sherrell, 1993) or from a source with whom
they have a close relationship (Lundgren & Rudawsky, 1998). Additionally, self-esteem
moderates the relationship between many of these variables and feedback acceptance
(Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970; Stotland, Thorley, Thomas, Cohen, & Zander, 1957;
Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1999). The present study examined the primary
hypothesis that the reputation of an evaluator regarding feedback affects feedback
acceptance. Reputation refers to the general perceptions by others of the evaluator’s
tendency to give feedback that is either positive or negative. Specifically, it was proposed
that feedback that was inconsistent with the reputation of an evaluator would influence
the recipient’s self-perceptions more than consistent feedback. A secondary hypothesis
was that the effects of source reputation on feedback acceptance would depend on selfesteem level.
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People seek out knowledge about themselves (Baumeister, 1999). However, people
are also driven by internal needs that result in biases in processing that information. A
basic understanding of how self-relevant information is processed is fundamental to
understanding how self-perceptions change based on feedback as well as why processing
of this information is likely to be biased.
Two very similar theories view information processing as occurring through two
pathways. The elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Wegener, 1998) and the heuristicsystematic model (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) are referred to as dual-mode
processing models. According to both of these theories, there are two routes by which
information is processed: one that requires a large amount of effort and carefully
examines information (central route or systematic processing), and another that is based
on heuristics, or mental shortcuts, and requires less effort (peripheral route or heuristic
processing).
The processing pathway used depends on the availability of motivation and ability to
process information (Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997). Motivation to process
information might be low if the topic seems uninteresting or irrelevant, or if the person
processing the information feels that his attitude toward the topic is of little importance.
The ability to process information may be lacking when people are very distracted or if
they do not have enough prerequisite knowledge to process the incoming information.
Certain factors, including framing a message in an unexpected way, or including key
phrases that reference broad sets of values, tend to increase systematic processing (Petty
et al., 1997).
Based on these two requirements for systematic processing, it is reasonable to expect
that self-relevant information will almost always be processed systematically. Motivation
to process such information should be high, since self-interest is a large determining
factor of an issue’s importance (Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995; Petty, Cacioppo, &
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Haugtvedt, 1992). Additionally, one should be highly able to process self-relevant
information, because prerequisite knowledge of the topic should be abundant. Research
supports this idea that self-relevance increases systematic processing (Turco, 1996) and
has linked the use of self-relevance in processing of personal information to more
powerful encoding and better memory of that information (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker,
1999). Systematic processing is likely to result in biased processing (Petty et al., 1997). It
has also been found that possession of knowledge relevant to the attitude can result in
biased information processing (Biek, Wood, & Chaiken, 1996). When the topic is
oneself, it can surely be said that one possesses a great deal of relevant knowledge. So,
from an information processing perspective, people are highly motivated and equipped to
process and understand self-relevant information. Therefore, self-relevant evaluative
feedback would be expected to be processed systematically and with bias.
Two motives have been identified that can bias the processing of self-relevant
information: self-enhancement (Baumeister, 1998) and self-verification (Swann, 1987).
Self-enhancement is the need to view oneself positively. People generally seek and accept
feedback that allows them to feel good about themselves, resulting in a bias toward
positive feedback (Baumeister, 1998). Self-verification is the need for consistency within
the self-concept (Swann, 1987). Because of this motive, information that agrees with the
current view of the self is more easily accepted than information that conflicts with it. In
many instances, positive feedback satisfies the needs for both enhancement and
verification. However, there are also times when positive feedback may be inconsistent
with one’s self-concept.
In people with low self-esteem, there can exist a conflict in motives called cognitiveaffective crossfire (Swann et al., 1999). Individuals with low self-esteem have a relatively
less positive view of themselves, so that negative self-relevant information may fulfill the
need for self-verification, whereas positive self-relevant information fulfills the need for
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self-enhancement. So, for people low in self-esteem, these two motives can be at odds.
This was exemplified in a study in which people with high and low self-esteem were
given either positive or negative feedback on a social sensitivity task and changes in their
perceived social sensitivity were measured (Shrauger & Rosenberg, 1970). Selfperceptions of high self-esteem participants in that domain rose if they were given
positive feedback but did not change if they received negative feedback. Low self-esteem
participants lowered their self-perceptions of social sensitivity when given negative
feedback, but did not change them when given positive feedback. This indicates that
feedback consistent with self-esteem level is accepted, and inconsistent feedback is
rejected.
Research has also shown that high and low self-esteem individuals react differently
to social input in other ways that are pertinent to the topic of this investigation. People
with low self-esteem have been shown to be more susceptible to persuasion than high
self-esteem individuals (Janis, 1954). Compared to those with high self-esteem, people
with low self-esteem are more affected by negative feedback and less affected by positive
feedback, even when they have comparable starting self-perceptions prior to feedback
(Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1999). Additionally, people with low self-esteem are more
distressed by failure than high self-esteem people (Kernis, Brockner, & Frankel, 1989).
Another way that self-esteem affects reactions to feedback is through expectations.
Initial self-perceptions or self-esteem might be the basis for expectations of how one will
perform, and for the feedback expected. For example, people who have low self-esteem
are more likely to perceive themselves as less capable of earning positive feedback than
people with high self-esteem, and therefore might expect negative feedback, and be
surprised by positive feedback (Schrauger, 1975). It has also been demonstrated that
subjects who are high in self-efficacy for a task (they expect to do well) tend to rate
positive feedback as more accurate than negative feedback, and people low in self-
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efficacy find positive feedback to be less accurate (Alden, 1986). In another study,
subjects who expected positive feedback were given feedback that was even more
positive than they expected, and people expecting negative feedback were given feedback
that was even more negative than expected (Harvey & Clapp, 1965). Both of these groups
that received feedback that was consistent with expectations changed their selfevaluations in the direction of the feedback, while subjects whose self-perceptions and
feedback were in opposite directions did not show a change. In the present study, global
self-esteem rather than self-esteem specific to social awareness was used to represent
existing self-views given the considerable literature on the role global self-esteem plays in
feedback acceptance. Like self-esteem level and existing self-perceptions, perceptions of
the evaluator as easy or hard might affect feedback acceptance by influencing recipient
expectations.
Attribution theory is key to understanding many of the strategies people use to bias
information processing to fulfill the needs for self-enhancement and self-verification.
When people receive evaluative feedback, they attempt to explain the cause of that
outcome (Weiner, 1985). A crucial determinant of reactions to feedback is whether that
cause is perceived to be an aspect of the self (e.g., effort, intelligence, ability) or an aspect
of the situation (e.g., very critical evaluator, luck). These perceived causes are called
attributions. Weiner (1985, 1986) proposed three main factors in describing attributions:
locus of causality (internal or external), controllability (controllable or uncontrollable),
and stability (stable or unstable). For example, if a person receives negative feedback on a
quiz that was taken during a period of sickness, attributions for that bad grade would
probably be external (the flu), uncontrollable (can’t help getting sick), and unstable (will
feel better for future quizzes). People often meet enhancement and verification needs by
making self-serving attributions.
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Generally, people tend to accept responsibility for good outcomes and deny
responsibility for bad ones (Johnston & Nawrocki, 1967; Sicoly & Ross, 1977) to meet
self-enhancement needs. However, because the need for verification is often in conflict
with the need for enhancement in people with low self-esteem, self-esteem level also
influences attributions. Self-esteem has repeatedly been shown to predict emotional
(Brown & Dutton, 1995; Dutton & Brown, 1997), cognitive, (Shrauger & Rosenberg,
1970), and behavioral (Silverman, 1964) responses to feedback. People with high selfesteem are especially able to satisfy the need for self-enhancement by interpreting events
in ways that protect or increase their self-esteem (Brown, 1993; Shrauger, 1975). One
way they do this is by questioning the credibility of the source of negative feedback
(Markus, 1977) including both the task or test that is given (Crary 1966; Shrauger, 1975)
and the human evaluator (Shrauger & Lund, 1975). In contrast, people who have low selfesteem are inclined to make internal attributions for negative feedback (Fitch, 1970). In
addition to consistency with self-esteem level, consistency of feedback with expectations
and initial domain-specific self-perceptions can also be achieved through self-serving
attributions. Feedback inconsistent with expectations (Alden, 1986; Feather, 1969) or
existing self-perceptions (Crary, 1966) tends to be externally attributed to characteristics
of the evaluator or task, thereby decreasing its influence on self-perceptions.
Two final theories guide the present hypothesis. Adaptation-level theory (Helson,
1964) posits that judgment of a stimulus is not isolated. Instead, it depends on an
adaptation level that is established by the group to which the stimulus belongs. Judgments
are made by comparing a stimulus to what is considered normal for that class. According
to adaptation-level theory, in an evaluative feedback relationship, the adaptation levels of
recipients for their own feedback is determined by knowledge they have about feedback
that has been given to others. Therefore, participant reactions to the feedback they receive
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might depend on the adaptation level that is established in part by knowledge of an
evaluator’s reputation.
Similarly, social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) states that people compare
themselves to others to make self-evaluations, and comparing oneself to someone
perceived as better will negatively impact self-evaluations, whereas comparing oneself to
another perceived as worse results in more positive self-evaluations. This is known as a
contrast effect, meaning that contrasting one’s current self-perceptions with perceptions
of others results in a movement away from one’s initial self-perception in the opposite
direction of the perception of others. Contrast effects are strongest when people are
unsure of their own self-perceptions and assimilation effects can occur if they are
relatively certain in their self-views (Pelham & Wachsmuth, 1995). Together, adaptationlevel theory and social comparison theory predict that knowledge of evaluations given to
others will affect one’s reaction to his own feedback.
The goal of this study was to examine the effect of evaluator reputation on feedback
recipient self-perceptions, and the roles played by feedback valence and self-esteem.
Participants high or low in self-esteem were given either positive or negative feedback on
a task by an evaluator with the reputation of being either easy or hard. Following
feedback, self-perceptions in the domain related to the task (social awareness) were
assessed. It was hypothesized that evaluator reputation would interact with feedback
valence and self-esteem to determine the amount of change that occurred in selfperceptions of social awareness. Feedback that was inconsistent with the evaluator’s
reputation was expected to affect self-perceptions more than feedback consistent with the
evaluator’s reputation. Additionally, feedback that was in agreement with self-esteem
level was expected to have a greater effect on self-perceptions than feedback that was not.
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Chapter 2
Method
Participants
Participants were 113 undergraduate students at a large metropolitan university. The
sample was 76.1% female, and 50.4% African American, 44.2% White, 3.5% Native
American/Alaska Native, 2.7% Asian, 0.9% Hispanic, and 4.4% other. Participants
ranged from 18 to 50 years of age (M = 22, SD = 5.1). Participants were recruited via an
online participant recruitment system and from classes whose instructors allowed the
experimenter to announce the study during class. They received course or extra credit for
participating. These participants were selected from a total of 165 individuals because
they scored at or above the 66.67 percentile score or at or below the 33.33 percentile
score on a prescreen of self-esteem level. Individuals in the middle range of self-esteem
were excluded to increase the ability to detect the hypothesized linear effect of selfesteem.
Procedure
The research protocol was reviewed and approved by the university’s Institutional
Review Board (see Appendix 1). Prior to the experimental session, participants took the
measures of self-esteem and self-perceived social awareness as pretests to qualify for
participation in the study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions:
easy evaluator/positive feedback, easy evaluator/negative feedback, hard
evaluator/positive feedback, or hard evaluator/negative feedback. When participants
arrived, they were assigned an envelope designating their condition; however, the
researcher and research assistant remained blind to the condition until immediately prior
to delivering their respective manipulations. They also remained unaware of which
manipulations the other gave. This ensured that participants were not treated
systematically differently prior to the manipulations due to experimenter expectancies.
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The topic of the experiment presented to participants when they signed up for this
study was “Social Awareness in College Students.” Participants reported to the lab
individually and were greeted by a research assistant. The research assistant briefly
introduced the participant to the experimenter and told the participant that the
experimenter would be evaluating them. The research assistant and participant entered a
smaller room, where the research assistant closed the door and obtained consent to
participate (see Appendix 2). After setting up an online survey system, the research
assistant explained that the participant would be completing a social awareness task
which would measure awareness of the feelings and emotions of others. Participants were
told that their responses would be evaluated by the experimenter, who would tell them
how they did and explain the results. Participants were left alone to complete the task,
and were instructed to notify the research assistant when they finished.
The social awareness task was designed by the researcher for the purposes of this
study to be a believable measure of social awareness to participants (see Appendix 3).
Three images of people were presented onscreen, and participants were asked to write a
story about what those people were thinking and feeling and what was happening in the
situation. Images were in black and white and depicted people in ambiguous situations to
allow for many different interpretations. The first image was of a woman and man staring
off in different directions, the second was of several men congregating in a parking
garage, and the third showed a woman holding an umbrella looking at a train. Participants
were given four minutes to write each story. Responses to the social awareness task were
not actually read by the experimenter during the procedure because feedback valence was
randomly determined; however, subsequent examination of responses confirmed that all
participants followed directions on the task.
When the participant reported to the assistant that the task was complete, the
research assistant walked with the participant back into the testing room, ostensibly to
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send the participant’s responses on the social awareness task to the experimenter, and
closed the door. While pretending to send the results, the research assistant told the
participant that their responses were being sent to the experimenter so the participant
could be evaluated. For participants in the negative source condition, the assistant
lowered her voice and casually mentioned that the experimenter was a really harsh
evaluator, and everyone so far had received a really bad evaluation. In the positive source
condition, the assistant said in a lowered voice that the evaluator was a really easy
evaluator, and everyone so far had received a really good evaluation. The assistant then
told the participant that the experimenter would read and evaluate the participant’s
responses and would come speak to them in a few minutes.
After approximately 4 min, the experimenter entered the testing room to deliver
either positive or negative feedback (see Appendix 4). For participants assigned to the
positive feedback condition, the experimenter told them that she saw them as very high in
social awareness and rated them a 9.7 out of 10. She explained that they were very
attuned to the feelings of others and were consequently better at building and maintaining
relationships than many people. In the negative feedback condition, participants were told
that they were very low in social awareness and received a 4.3 out of 10. The
experimenter told them that they were not very attuned to the feelings of others and were
not as good as many people at building and maintaining relationships.
The experimenter then told the participant that the research assistant would set them
up for a final survey, after which the study would be complete. The experimenter left the
room, and the research assistant started the survey program. This final survey included the
self-perception measure and manipulation check survey.
After all measures were complete, participants were debriefed extensively (see
Appendix 5). Participants were asked questions to probe for suspicion, and the rationale
for the study was explained. The experimenter assured all participants that the social
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awareness task was fake, and that feedback was in no way based on their performance on
the task or their social awareness, but was randomly assigned. They were told that the
comments made by the research assistant about the experimenter were also randomly
determined, and that the entire situation was carefully constructed to seem real, because
when people know what a researcher is looking for, they tend to behave differently. The
experimenter asked the participant not to reveal this information to others who may
become participants. The participant was given the opportunity to ask questions, and the
experimenter looked for signs that participants, especially those who received negative
feedback, were upset. Participants were given the debriefing form, which included
information for campus psychological and counseling resources in case they became
distressed later. They were also invited to contact the researcher if any future questions
arose, or if they would like information on the findings from the study.
Measures
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. This 10-item self-report scale assessed global selfesteem (Rosenberg, 1965; see Appendix 6). Sample items included, “At times I think I
am no good at all,” and, “I feel that I have a number of good qualities.” Response options
were strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree, with some items reversecoded. Internal consistency reliability in the United States has been found to be good,
with a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 (Schmitt & Allik, 2005).
Self-Perception Measure. This self-report measure contained six items used to
assess self-perceptions of social awareness and fourteen distractor items. Because no
scales existed that measured social awareness as defined in this study, this measure was
specifically created to assess self-perceptions in the feedback domain (see Appendix 7). A
sample item is, “I can sense how others feel.” Responses were scored on a 10-point scale,
with labels of completely false (1), somewhat false (4), somewhat true (7), and completely
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true (10). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .92, indicating excellent internal
consistency.
Manipulation Check Survey. A manipulation check survey was included to assess
the degree to which manipulations of perceived evaluator reputation and feedback
valence were successful (see Appendix 8). One item asked participants to rate their
evaluator on a 10-point scale ranging from hard judge to easy judge. Another item asked
participants to indicate how positive or negative their feedback was on a similar scale
ranging from extremely negative to extremely positive. Participants were also asked to
report the percentage of people they thought scored lower than them.
Preliminary Analyses of Manipulations
Analysis indicated that the evaluator reputation manipulation delivered by the
research assistant affected participant ratings of the evaluator, with the evaluator in the
easy evaluator condition rated higher (M = 6.6) than in the hard evaluator condition (M =
4.7), F(1, 111) = 16.19, p < .001. Analysis also indicated that participants rated their
feedback more positively in the positive feedback condition (M = 9.7) than in the negative
feedback condition (M = 4.0), F(1, 111) = 348.90, p < .001. When participants were
asked what percentage of people they thought scored lower than them, participants who
received positive feedback reported a higher percentage (M = 53.8) than the percentage
reported by participants in the negative feedback condition (M = 23.6), F(1, 111) = 62.64,
p < .001.
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Chapter 3
Results
Participant self-ratings of social awareness were analyzed using a 2 (evaluator) × 2
(feedback) × 2 (self-esteem) analysis of variance with pretest scores on self-rated social
awareness as a covariate. Analysis indicated that the effect of the evaluator’s reputation
depended on whether the feedback was positive or negative, Evaluator × Feedback F(1,
104) = 3.79, p = .05. As Figure 1 illustrates, when the feedback was positive, participants
had higher self-ratings with an easy evaluator (adj M = 8.5) than with a hard evaluator
(adj M = 8.1), F(1, 104) = 1.41, p = .2. On the other hand, when the feedback was
negative, participants had lower self-ratings with an easy evaluator (adj M = 6.4) than
with a hard evaluator (adj M = 6.8), F(1, 104) = 2.44, p = .1.

Figure 1. The interaction of evaluator reputation and feedback
valence in their effects on perceived social awareness.
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The effects of this interaction did not vary reliably based on self-esteem level,
Evaluator × Feedback × Self-Esteem F(1, 104) = 1.38, p = .2, nor was there a statistically
significant main effect of self-esteem level on self-rated social awareness F(1, 104) =
.001, p > .9. Analyses using self-esteem cut-points other than the top and bottom thirds
resulted in the same findings. Additionally, pretest scores did not interact reliably with
any other factors, suggesting that effects of evaluator reputation on feedback acceptance
did not vary depending on domain-specific self-perceptions (all ps > .1).
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Chapter 4
Discussion
Results did not support the primary hypothesis that feedback that was inconsistent
with evaluator reputation would have a greater effect on participant self-perceptions than
feedback from a consistent evaluator. It was also hypothesized that the effects of feedback
would depend on participant self-esteem levels, and results did not provide support for
this hypothesis. Findings do, however, suggest a different relationship between feedback
valence and evaluator reputation.
In this study, evaluator reputation and feedback valence interacted in their effects on
self-perceptions. Participants who perceived their evaluator as easy tended to change their
self-perceptions in the direction of feedback more than the group with a hard evaluator.
Three possible explanations for this finding are offered.
First, it may be that people who perceived the evaluator to be easy perceived the
evaluator in a generally more positive light (e.g., more likable) and, therefore, cared more
about their evaluation. People tend to hold stereotypes that cause them to assume that if a
person possesses one trait, they also possess other traits. This tendency has been labeled
with such terms as the halo effect or correlational bias (e.g., Berman & Kenny, 1976;
Cooper, 1981; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). For instance, if someone is perceived to be
friendly, this might result in them also being perceived as intelligent, trustworthy, and
loyal. Evaluators who are believed to give positive feedback may also be seen as
possessing other positive traits that might result in greater feedback acceptance.
Evaluators believed to give negative feedback may be seen as having other undesirable
traits which may result in the discounting of their feedback. Studies have found that when
the source of feedback (Binderman et al., 1972; Halperin et al., 1976; Shrauger &
Schoeneman, 1999) or persuasive communication (Andreoli & Worchel, 1978; Hovland
& Weiss, 1951; Wilson & Sherrell, 1993) is seen as more credible, the feedback or
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message has a greater effect on the target. Credibility has most often been defined as
including characteristics such as expertise, status, and trustworthiness. Perhaps through
halo effects, evaluator reputation affects perceptions of source credibility and/or global
perceptions of the evaluator as positive or negative, resulting in feedback from an easy
evaluator being given more weight than feedback from a harsh evaluator. Indeed, Keeley,
English, Irons, and Henslee (2013) found evidence that the halo effect was at play in
teacher evaluations. When certain characteristics of teachers were manipulated,
participants shifted their ratings of the teachers overall and on seemingly unrelated
characteristics in the same direction. Future research might attempt to replicate and
extend results of the current study by measuring credibility along with perceptions of the
evaluator on other dimensions to see whether this halo effect explanation is supported.
A second interpretation might be that, when feedback was negative, participants
were affected by evaluator reputation in a pattern consistent with the primary hypothesis.
They were more affected by negative feedback from an easy (inconsistent) judge than
feedback from a hard (consistent) judge. However, because positive feedback is the social
norm and there are often social sanctions associated with conveying negative evaluations
of others (Shrauger & Schoeneman, 1999), participants in the positive feedback condition
may have doubted the veracity of their feedback. Therefore, they may have needed to
utilize source cues to determine whether they should accept their feedback. In this case,
people may have discounted the feedback from the hard source because they suspected
that it was insincere.
A third possibility is that this finding happened by chance. It could be that this
pattern occurred in the sample used in this experiment, but would not occur in other
samples. Replication in future research would clarify whether the effect found in this
study is reliable.
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Interestingly, and contrary to the original hypothesis, self-esteem level did not
statistically significantly interact with evaluator reputation or feedback valence. It was
thought that self-esteem level would be important in this relationship because participants
with low self-esteem would experience a conflict between the goals of self-enhancement
and self-verification. This effect has been demonstrated in past research (Shrauger &
Rosenberg, 1970; Stotland et al., 1957; Swann et al., 1999). However, low self-esteem
reflects a relatively less positive, but not necessarily negative, self-view. Low scores on
self-esteem measures usually reflect responses that are neutral but not necessarily
negative, and few people score lower than the conceptual average on self-esteem
measures (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989). Thus, the low self-esteem group, while
possessing relatively less positive self-views than the high self-esteem group, may not
have held negative self-views. This would mean that the need for self-verification may
not have conflicted with the need for self-enhancement, and participants responded
similarly to feedback regardless of self-esteem scores. Additionally, Baumeister et al.
(1989) have suggested that self-esteem scales measure a self-presentational orientation,
and that self-presentation may account for some behavioral findings from past research
based on self-esteem scales. Whereas people who score high on self-esteem scales tend to
call attention to themselves and exhibit a self-enhancing presentation style, people with
low self-esteem scores tend to avoid drawing attention and have a protective selfpresentation style (Baumeister et al., 1989). It is perhaps possible that, had feedback been
given in front of a group instead of one-on-one, differences between self-esteem groups
may have been observed.
It should be noted that, although this experiment successfully manipulated perceived
evaluator reputation, which was the construct of interest, it did not differentiate between
more specific constructs that evaluator reputation encompasses. Future studies might be
able to separately manipulate participant expectations, perceptions of the evaluator’s
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standards, or social comparison processes activated by perceptions of evaluator reputation
to elucidate how evaluator reputation influences recipient self-perceptions. For example,
feedback that is inconsistent with expectations is more likely to be attributed to external
versus internal causes (Alden, 1986; Feather, 1969), but it is not known what effect
evaluator reputation has over and above effects produced by the simple expectation of a
certain type of feedback.
As is common in laboratory experiments, this study’s external validity suffered in
some ways in exchange for higher internal validity. Careful control allowed extraneous
variables to be ruled out, but further research is needed to see if this effect occurs in reallife situations. For instance, in the context of work or school, things like perceptions of
the legitimacy of an evaluator’s authority or actual implications of feedback (i.e. not
graduating, having to redo a task, loss of income) may influence responses to feedback as
well. Also, participants in this experiment were all college students, which means that
they were used to being evaluated in the context of their courses in the form of grades.
This may predispose them to certain types of responses to feedback that might not be seen
in populations that are not in college or have never attended college. On average,
participants were college-aged, which may also affect the generalizability of results.
There is evidence to suggest that the self-concept is more malleable (Demo, 1992) and
people are more susceptible to persuasion (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989) at certain points in
the lifespan. Additionally, self-perceptions were measured immediately after feedback,
and so this study does not address the question of whether the effects of feedback and
source reputation on self-perceptions last over time. Because half of the participants
received negative feedback in what was intended to be a relatively important self-concept
domain, it was necessary to limit the amount of time that they believed the feedback was
true. Thus, participants were fully debriefed within 15 min of the feedback manipulation
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in this study. However, future research might test the degree to which any effect of
evaluator reputation on feedback acceptance persists.
Measures were self-report, and so may have been influenced by perceived
experimenter expectancies and social desirability concerns. Distractor questions were
added to the self-perception measure to minimize this. Also, this measure of selfperceived social awareness had to be constructed for this study because existing
instruments did not measure the construct of interest. Although the measure was piloted
and the most reliable items were used, the validity of the measure has not been
established. However, in the interest of maintaining construct validity, it was necessary
that the measure was worded in such a way that it corresponded to the social awareness
task and the feedback participants received.
Although further research is needed to understand why evaluator reputation affected
feedback acceptance, results of this study suggest that people are more affected by
feedback when they perceive their evaluator to be easy rather than hard. Findings may
have implications for the fields of sports psychology, organizational psychology, and
academics. Generally, it seems that if a coach, supervisor, or instructor wants feedback to
be taken seriously, it would be beneficial to project the image of being a relatively easy
evaluator. However, depending on the desired outcome, this could theoretically have a
couple of different effects that are at odds with one another. Although feedback from the
easy evaluator may be internalized more than feedback from the hard evaluator,
perception of the evaluator as easy may detract from desired behaviors. For example,
students who perceive their teacher to be easy may actually study less, spend less time on
homework, and ultimately learn less than students with a teacher perceived as hard.
To summarize, in this study the evaluator’s reputation as hard or easy influenced the
degree to which feedback affected the feedback recipient’s self-perceptions. Specifically,
feedback had a greater effect on participant self-perceptions when it came from an easy
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evaluator than when it came from a hard evaluator. Further research is needed to explain
why this effect may have occurred, but findings suggest that an evaluator’s reputation
should be taken into consideration when providing evaluative feedback.
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